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Abstract—Campaigners, advertisers and activists are increas-
ingly turning to social recommendation mechanisms, provided
by social media, for promoting their products, services, brands
and even ideas. However, many times, such social network based
campaigns perform poorly in practice because the intensity of
the recommendations drastically reduces beyond a few hops from
the source. A natural strategy for maintaining the intensity is
to provide incentives. In this paper, we address the problem of
minimizing the cost incurred by the campaigner for incentivizing
a fraction of individuals in the social network, while ensuring
that the campaign message reaches a given expected fraction of
individuals. We also address the dual problem of maximizing the
campaign penetration for a resource constrained campaigner. To
help us understand and solve the above mentioned problems,
we use percolation theory to formally state them as optimization
problems. These problems are not amenable to traditional ap-
proaches because of a fixed point equation that needs to be solved
numerically. However, we use results from reliability theory to
establish some key properties of the fixed point, which in turn
enables us to solve these problems using algorithms that are
linearithmic in maximum node degree. Furthermore, we evaluate
the efficacy of the analytical solution by performing simulations
on real world networks.
Index Terms—Social Networks, Incentivized Campaigns, In-
formation Control, Bootstrapped Percolation, Reliability Theory
I. INTRODUCTION
On-line social networking services have enabled advertisers,
campaigners and activists to reach millions of individuals. In
particular, the ability to recommend or share web articles [1],
videos [2], and other media can be harnessed by campaigners
for disseminating information to a worldwide audience. While
such social network based campaigns sound promising, due
to the fact that ideas propagate only a few hops from their
origins [3], often, they are found to perform poorly in practice.
Providing incentives for recommendations is a natural solution
for increasing the hop count. For example, Dropbox, which
offers cloud storage services, increased its customer base
rapidly by offering incentives for social recommendations [4].
Although such referrals may increase the short term costs to
the company by generating a large number of registrations for
the free service, in the long term, the free registrations pay off,
since a significant portion of free users eventually migrate to
the premium service. Also, to keep the cost down, they capped
the referral payouts — additional 500 MB only for the first
28 referrals, i.e. the referral payout is capped at 14 GB.
An alternative mechanism to limiting the cost is to cap the
number of incentivized individuals, i.e., instead of capping in-
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centive payments, offer large referral rewards1 to a preselected
set of individuals2. This approach allows the campaigner to
target individuals who are best suited to use and recommend
the service to their co-workers or friends.
A. Related Work
In [5–7], the authors consider nodes to be either active
or inactive. Making an inactive node active — not through
network effects, but through direct intervention for kick-
starting the campaign — is termed as “seeding.” Assuming
full knowledge of the network structure, i.e., the adjacency
matrix, the question asked in [5–7] is; Given a constraint on
the number of seeds, what is the optimal set of seed nodes
that would maximize the reach of the campaign? However,
in several real-world settings, we may just have access to the
statistical properties of the network. Also, the authors in [5–
7] do not consider the cost incurred due to incentivization.
Incentivization is the process of providing incentives to nodes
who are already active, to persuade their friends to sign up.
Incentivization happens throughout the campaign, whereas
seeding, as discussed in [5], happens only at the beginning.
A related problem involving the calculation of an optimal
pricing strategy for products sold to individuals in a social
network was explored in [8, 9]. The authors in [8, 9] consider
the problem of pricing a product and calculating the amount
of cash-back (discount) that is provided to individuals as an
incentive to evangelize the product. In this paper, we do not
focus on optimal pricing, but rather focus on the size and
cost of the campaign where individuals do not incur a cost to
register for the service. The problems studied in this paper
are more appropriate in settings where the service is free,
or is based on a freemium model. Furthermore, we only
assume partial knowledge of the network and also incorporate
constraints that ensure a given campaign penetration, whereas
the algorithms proposed in [8, 9] assume full knowledge of
the network structure and do not consider any constraint on
the campaign size.
The problem of computing the optimal referral payment
mechanisms that maximize profit was studied in [10], by
modelling the referral process as a network game. The authors
in [10] conclude that a combination of linear payment mecha-
nism (linear in the number of referrals) and threshold payment
mechanism (payment only when number of referral exceeds
a threshold) approximates the optimal pricing scheme. In this
1For example the living social website gives 100% cash-back on a
purchased product if the customer persuades three others to buy the (same)
product. Another famous example of uncapped referrals is Uber, and also the
taxi service Lyft.
2Instead of advertising the referral scheme, a randomized scheme can be
advertised. For example, the advertisement could be “those who register for
the service will get a chance to win discounts for referring their friends.”
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2paper, we focus on the set of nodes to be incentivized while
assuming that a pricing scheme, which can be computed based
on the results in [10], is provided by the campaigner. Similar
problems involving the computation of referral rewards in real
time, for maximizing the campaign spread, were studied using
the theory of optimal control in [11–15].
B. Our Contributions
We consider a scheme where preselected incentivized in-
dividuals are presented with a reward when they register for
the service, encouraging them to spread the news about the
service to their friends. The decision of whether to offer
an incentive to an individual is precomputed based on the
solution of an optimization problem. We use a variant of
the linear threshold model [5] for modelling the campaign
spreading process. For a given fraction of such incentivized
individuals, we first compute the campaign size (expected
fraction of registered individuals) using bootstrap percolation.
We then use this quantity to formulate the following optimiza-
tion problems: 1). minimize the cost for achieving a given
expected fraction of registered individuals, and 2). maximize
the expected fraction of registered individuals for a given
cost budget. These optimization problems are not amenable to
traditional approaches because of a fixed point equation that
needs to be solved numerically. However, we use results from
reliability theory to establish some key properties of the fixed
point, which in turn enables us to solve these problems using
algorithms that are linearithmic in the maximum node degree.
Through extensive simulations, we also study the efficacy our
incentivization scheme in real world networks.
TABLE I
A SUMMARY OF KEY NOTATION
Notation Description
p(k) fraction of degree k nodes
kmax maximum node degree of graph G
pth(m|k) probability of a degree k node having threshold m
α1 activation probability of a type 1 node
α2 activation probability of a type 2 node
d mean node degree of graph G
q probability of encountering a type 2 node
by traversing a randomly chosen link
random variables that denote the number of type 2
Xk2 active neighbours of a degree k node, given that there
are k2 type 2 neighbours
random variables that denote the number of type 1
Yk−k2 active neighbours of a degree k node, given that there
are k − k2 type 1 neighbours
u probability of reaching a registered node by following
an arbitrary edge of the graph
uq fixed point of Equation (3)
s(q) expected fraction of registered nodes
at the end of the campaign
sk(q) expected fraction of degree k registered
nodes at the end of the campaign
ck cost of incentivizing a degree k node
φ(k) probability of incentivizing a degree k node
γ minimum expected fraction of registered nodes
c maximum expected incentivization cost
The key notation used in this paper is summarized in Table I.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the campaign model. In Section III, using
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Fig. 1. Flow chart denoting the various stages of a node; m denotes the
threshold of node i, α1 and α2 are the activation probabilities of incentivized
and non-incentivized nodes, respectively.
results from percolation theory, we compute the campaign
size (expected proportion of registered individuals). Using this
quantity, we formulate and solve two relevant optimization
problems in Sections IV and V. In Section VI, we compare
the analytical results with simulation performed on real-world
networks. Finally, in Section VII, we conclude the paper.
II. MODEL
Consider a set of N = {1, 2, · · · , n} individuals who
are connected to one another through a social network. For
analytical tractability, as in [16, 17], we consider this network
to be arbitrary, connected3, locally tree-like and uncorrelated4.
We represent this network as an undirected graph G(N ,L),
where N and L represent the set of nodes and links of graph
G, respectively. An undirected edge (a, b) ∈ L if individuals a
and b are neighbours in the underlying social network. In most
scenarios, full knowledge of the network structure may not be
available to the campaigner. In such cases, the campaigner
can obtain statistical properties of the network through data
mining. One such property is the degree distribution. Let
{p(k), k ≥ 1} be the degree distribution of graph G.
We consider a campaign on the network represented by
graph G (see Fig. 1 for the flow chart). The nodes in graph
G can be either in “active”, “registered” or “unregistered”
state. Once active, a node remains active. Active nodes are
very spirited and express their strong support for the campaign
3The configuration model random graph is connected with high probability
if and only if the minimum degree is greater than or equal to 3.
4Uncorrelated networks are networks where the degree of a node is
statistically independent of the degree of any other node in the network [18].
3by encouraging their neighbours to register, whereas nodes in
the registered and unregistered states refrain from recommen-
dations. For a node to become active, it must first show support
for the campaign by registering itself. However, all registered
nodes need not be active.
The campaign starts with a set of zealous individuals —
those who intrinsically desire the service. These nodes do not
need any recommendation to register, and are registered for
the campaign from the very start. If a zealous node becomes
active, it will recommend the service to its neighbours. On
the other hand, nodes that are not zealous, register only if the
number of active neighbours exceeds a predefined threshold
value (see Fig. 1). Let pth(m|k) denote the probability of a
degree k node having threshold m. This is a generalization of
the celebrated linear threshold model [5] — a model of choice
for studying the dissemination and adoption of new products,
technologies and ideas [19–22]. We note that, by definition,∑
k≥1 p(k) · pth(0|k) denotes the fraction of zealous nodes in
the network5 — fraction of nodes that register without any
recommendations.
A node that receives a reward when it registers for the
service is more likely to tell its neighbours about the reward
and encourage them to register. Therefore, we divide the nodes
into two categories: the ‘non-incentivized’ (type 1) and the
‘incentivized’ (type 2). The campaigner decides the fraction of
incentivized nodes before the start of the campaign6. However,
these nodes become aware of the fact that they are incentivized
only if they register for the service7. Since incentivized nodes
are provided with incentives upon registration, they are more
likely to be enthused, and will play an active part in the
campaign than non-incentivized nodes. Let α1 ∈ (0, 1] and
α2 ∈ (0, 1] be the probabilities of a non-incentivized (type 1)
and incentivized (type 2) node becoming active, respectively.
Due to the presence of incentives, we assume that α2 > α1.
III. COMPUTING THE CASCADE SIZE
Before presenting the problems, we need to first compute
cascade size, i.e., the expected fraction of nodes that have
registered at the end of the campaign. Let p(k′|k) be the
probability of encountering a degree k′ node by traversing
a link from a degree k node. From [16], we know that
this conditional distribution, for an uncorrelated network, has
the following form p(k′|k) = k′·p(k′)
d
, where d denotes the
mean degree of the graph G. Let q(k) be the probability of
encountering a type 2 node by traversing a randomly chosen
link from a degree k node. Then, we have
q(k) =
∑
k′≥1 Pr[type 2 neigh.|k
′
] · p(k′ |k)
=
∑
k′≥1 φ(k
′
) · p(k′ |k) = 1
d
∑
k′≥1 k
′
φ(k
′
)p(k
′
)
5Campaigner can estimate the fraction of zealous nodes by conducting
surveys on a reasonable sized demographic.
6Alternatively, whenever an individual registers, the campaigner can dynam-
ically decide whether to incentivize this individual. This problem is similar
to stochastic control problems, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
7Incentives are assigned assuming knowledge of the exact degree of
the registered node, because the exact node degree can be obtained after
registering. For example, one can ask individuals to register through an on-
line social network, and compute the exact degree from their contact list.
Since q(k) is independent of k, let q(k) = q ∀ k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , kmax}. Here, kmax is the maximum node degree.
Since the network is locally tree-like, with some effort, it
can be shown that the number of type 2 neighbours of a degree
k node is a binomial random variable with the probability
distribution function pˆ(k2|k) =
(
k
k2
) · qk2 · (1 − q)k−k2 . Let
pex(k
′
) be the excess degree distribution, i.e., the degree
distribution of a node encountered by following a randomly
chosen link without counting that link. For an uncorrelated
network, from [17], we know that pex(k
′
) = (k
′
+1)·p(k′+1)
d
.
Now, let u denote the probability of reaching a registered
node by following an arbitrary edge of the graph. First, let
us consider an arbitrary node j of degree k and threshold m.
Next, we compute the probability that node j registers due
to recommendations from its active neighbours, given that we
have arrived at node j by following an arbitrary link in the
graph. For ease of presentation, we do not explicitly write the
condition “following an arbitrary link.”
P [j registers |j is of degree k, j has threshold m]
(a)
=
∑k
l=mP [j has l active neighbours|j is of degree k]
=
∑k
l=m
∑k
k2=0
P [k2 type 2 neighbours|j is of degree k]
· P [l active neigh.|j is of degree k and k2 type 2 neigh.]
)
=
∑k
l=m
(∑k
k2=0
pˆ(k2|k) · P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 = l]
)
=
∑k
k2=0
pˆ(k2|k) · P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m] (1)
where Equality (a) follows because the events {j registers}
and {j has m or more active neighbours given that j has
threshold m} are equivalent, and the events {j has l active
neighbours} and {j has threshold m} are independent of each
other.
In Equality (1), Xk2 and Yk−k2 are random variables that
denote the number of type 2 and type 1 active neighbours of
a degree k node, given that there are k2 type 2 and k − k2
type 1 neighbours. With some effort, it can be shown that
random variables Xk2 and Yk−k2 are independent and have
a binomial distribution with parameters (k2, α2u) and (k −
k2, α1u), respectively. Here, α1 and α2 are the probability of
a type 1 and type 2 node becoming active, respectively. The
independence occurs because the probability of incentivizing
a node is independent of the degree of its neighbouring nodes.
The binomial distribution arises here because the network is
locally tree-like.
From Equation (1), it is evident that the probability of a
node registering is independent of its type8. Therefore, the
probability that by following an arbitrary link we can reach a
node that registers due to recommendations is given by
P [node registers due to recommendation] =
∑
k≥1 pex(k)·
P [node reg. due to recommendations|excess degree k]
8A node registers either if it is zealous (this event is independent of its
type), or through recommendations which depend on its neighbours and type
of neighbours but not on its type.
4f(q, u) =
∑
k≥0 pex(k) · pth(0|k + 1) +
∑
k≥1 pex(k)
∑
m≥1 pth(m|k + 1)
∑k
k2=0
pˆ(k2|k) · P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m]
=
∑
k≥0 pex(k) · pth(0|k + 1) +
∑
k≥1 pex(k)
∑
m≥1 pth(m|k + 1)
∑k
k2=0
(
k
k2
)
· qk2 · (1− q)k−k2 ·(∑
l+l′≥m
(
k2
l
)
(α2u)
l(1− α2u)k2−l
(
k − k2
l′
)
(α1u)
l
′
(1− α1u)k−k2−l
′
)
gk(q, u) = pth(0|k) +
∑
m≥1 pth(m|k)
∑k
k2=0
pˆ(k2|k) · P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m]
where Xk2 ∼ Bin(k2, α2u) and Yk−k2 ∼ Bin(k − k2, α1u)
=
∑
k≥1
pex(k)
∑
m≥1
P [node registers, node has threshold m|
node has excess degree k]
(a)
=
∑
k≥1
pex(k)
∑
m≥1
pth(m|k + 1) · P [node registers|
node has excess degree k, node has threshold m]
=
∑
k≥1
pex(k)
∑
m≥1
pth(m|k + 1)·
k∑
k2=0
(
k
k2
)
· qk2 · (1− q)k−k2 · P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m] (2)
On the RHS of Equation (2), we use the excess degree
distribution because we discount the link that we followed
to arrive at the node. In Equality (a), we use pth(m|k + 1)
because if we include the link on which we arrived, a node of
excess degree k will have k+1 links. Arguing along the lines
of [17], we can conclude that u has to satisfy the following
self consistency equation
u = P [node is zealous]
+ P [node reg. due to recommendations]
=
∑
k≥0 pex(k)pth(0|k + 1)
+ P [node reg. due to recommendations]
= f(q, u) (3)
where f(q, u) is as given at the top of this page.
For any q, Equation (3) is a fixed point equation in u.
However, due to the complex nature of the function f(q, u),
the existence of a u that satisfies Equation (3) is not obvious.
Using results from reliability theory, in Proposition 3.2, we
prove the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point of
Equation (3). Before that, the following proposition establishes
the nature of function f(q, u) (w.r.t u).
Proposition 3.1: If the fraction of zealous nodes lies in the
open interval (0, 1), then ∀ q ∈ [0, 1], f(q, u) is a continuously
differentiable, convex, monotonically increasing function of u.
Proof: In Appendix B-A.
Proposition 3.1 gives us some intuition about the existence
and uniqueness of the fixed point. However, we establish the
same rigorously in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2: For every q ∈ [0, 1],
(i) If no node in the network is zealous, then u = 0 is the
only solution of Equation (3).
(ii) If every node in the network is zealous, then u = 1 is
the only solution of Equation (3).
(iii) If the fraction of zealous nodes lies in the interval (0, 1),
then Equation (3) has a unique fixed point in (0, 1).
Proof: In Appendix B-B.
For ease of presentation, in the remainder of the paper, we
assume that the fraction of zealous nodes lies in the open
interval (0, 1). For any q ∈ [0, 1], let uq denote the fixed point
of Equation (3). Since the fixed point is unique, we can obtain
uq by iteratively solving Equation (3). Our next proposition
qualitatively describes the variation of the fixed point uq as
function of q.
Proposition 3.3: If α2 > α1, then uq is a strictly increasing
continuous function of q, i.e., ∂uq∂q > 0.
Proof: In Appendix C.
Now, given a q ∈ [0, 1], let sk(q) be the expected fraction of
degree k nodes that have registered at the end of the campaign.
The expression for sk(q) can be obtained as follows
sk(q) = P [node registers|degree k]
= P [node is zealous|degree k]
+ P [node reg. due to recommendations|degree k]
=
∑
m≥1P [node reg, node has threshold m|
node has degree k] + pth(0|k)
= pth(0|k) +
∑
m≥1pth(m|k)·
P [node reg|node has degree k, node has threshold m]
= gk(q, u)|u=uq (4)
where gk(q, u) is as given at the top of this page and uq is
the fixed point of Equation(3). Given a q ∈ [0, 1], let s(q)
be the expected fraction of nodes that have registered at the
end of the campaign. s(q) is also termed as the size of the
epidemic. Then, using arguments similar to the ones used to
derive Equation (5), it can be shown that
s(q) =
∑
k≥1 p(k) · gk(q, u)
∣∣∣
u=uq
=
∑
k≥1 p(k) · sk(q) (5)
Once again using results from reliability theory, in Proposi-
tion 3.4, we establish the increasing and non-decreasing nature
of functions g(q, u) and gk(q, u) (with respect to u and q).
Proposition 3.4: If α2 > α1, then
1) ∂g(q,u)∂q > 0 and
∂g(q,u)
∂u > 0
2) ∂gk(q,u)∂q ≥ 0 and ∂gk(q,u)∂u ≥ 0.
5Proof: Similar to that of Propositions 3.1 and C.1.
IV. COST MINIMIZATION UNDER CASCADE SIZE
CONSTRAINT
Providing incentives is a costly affair. The campaigner may
either be interested in minimizing the cost while guaranteeing
that a given proportion of population registers, or in maximiz-
ing the registrations for a given cost budget. In this section,
we look at the former problem.
A. Cost of incentivization
Incentives provided by the campaigner is usually a function
of its degree because the number of potential recommendations
depend on the degree. Let ck be the cost of incentivizing a
degree k node. Incentivized nodes obtain incentives only if
they registers. Therefore, the expected cost per incentivized
degree k node is given by ck · sk(q), where sk(q) (see
Equation 4) is the probability that an incentivized degree k
node registers. Let φ(k) denote the probability of incentivizing
a degree k node. Then, the average cost per node for incentive-
policy (φ = {φ(k), k ≥ 1}) is given by ∑k≥1 p(k)φ(k) ×
(cost of node of deg. k) =
∑
k≥1 p(k)·ck ·φ(k)·sk(q), where
q = 1
d
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φ(k).
B. Problem formulation
Minimizing the cost while providing guarantees on the
number of expected registrations is appropriate for campaigns
where the campaigners are mandated to achieve a given target.
This problem can be mathematically formulated as follows
min
0≤φ≤1
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k) · φ(k) · sk(q) (6)
Subject to: s(q) ≥ γ and q = 1
d
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φ(k)
where γ ∈ [0, γmax] is the minimum expected fraction of
registered individuals that must be achieved and d is the mean
degree of the network. Here, γmax is the expected fraction of
registered individuals obtained by incentivizing everyone. The
expression for sk(q) (Equation (4)) and s(q) (Equation (5))
involve uq , which is the solution to the fixed point Equa-
tion (3). Thus, it is not possible to apply traditional analytical
techniques such as the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
to solve the above problem. Furthermore, the problem may
be non convex, and applying numerical techniques such as
genetic algorithms, or Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods
may not yield a globally optimal solution.
C. Solution approach
In this section, we present transformations that allow us to
efficiently compute the global optima of the cost minimization
problem presented in the previous section. To help us with this,
we state and prove the following proposition. The intuition
behind this proposition is that, as α2 > α1, increasing q
increases the proportion of type 2 nodes, which results in a
higher s(q).
Proposition 4.1: If α2 > α1, then function s : [0, 1] →
[γmin, γmax] is a monotonically increasing bijection, where
γmax = s(0) and γmax = s(1) are the expected fraction of
registered individuals obtained by incentivizing nobody and
everybody, respectively.
Proof: We have
∂s(q)
∂q
=
∂
(
g(q, u)|u=uq
)
∂q
(a)
=
∂g(q, u)
∂q
∣∣∣∣∣
u=uq
+
∂g(q, u)
∂u
∣∣∣∣∣
u=uq
· ∂uq
∂q
= (> 0)
Proposition 3.4
+ (> 0)
Proposition 3.4
· (> 0)
Proposition 3.3
⇒ ∂s(q)
∂q
> 0 (7)
where Equality (a) follows from an application of the chain
rule. From Inequality (7), we can see that s(q) is a monoton-
ically increasing function defined on the closed interval [0, 1].
Hence, s : [0, 1]→ [γmin, γmax] is a bijection.
Proposition 4.1 establishes that s(q) is a monotonically
increasing function of q and is a bijection. Therefore, we can
replace the constraint s(q) ≥ γ with the constraint q ≥ qγ ,
where qγ is such that s(qγ) = γ. Since s(q) is a monotonically
increasing function of q, we can compute qγ by performing
a line search over the closed interval [0, 1]. The following
algorithm does this.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to compute qγ
1: Set q1 := 0 and q2 := 1
2: while |s(q1)− s(q2)| >  do
3: qmp := (q1 + q2)/2
4: Solve equation u = f(qmp, u) to obtain uqmp .
5: if s(qmp) < γ then
6: q1 := qmp
7: else
8: q2 := qmp
9: end if
10: end while
11: return qγ := (q1 + q2)/2
Proposition 4.1 does not tell us how the expected fraction
of registered degree k nodes (sk(q)) responds to changes in q.
While, the function sk(q) may not be a bijection for all values
of k, we show that it is a non-decreasing function of q, for
all values of k.
Proposition 4.2: If α2 > α1, then for all k ≥ 1, ∂sk(q)∂q ≥ 0
Proof: By first writing the total derivative in terms of the
partial derivatives (see Proposition 4.1), and then by using the
non-negativity of these partial derivatives (from Propositions
3.3 and 3.4).
Now, if γ ≤ γmin = s(0), then the cascade constraint
is met without incentivizing anyone. In such cases, the op-
timum incentive policy and the optimum cost is given by
{φ(k) = 0,∀k ≥ 1} and 0, respectively. On the other hand,
if γ = γmax = s(1), then the cascade constraint is met only
if everyone is incentivized, i.e., {φ(k) = 1,∀k ≥ 1}, and
the optimum cost is given by
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k) · sk(1). For the
cases when γ ∈ (γmin, γmax), due to Propositions 4.1, the
6cost minimization problem can be re-written as follows
P1 : min
0≤φ≤1
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k) · φ(k) · sk(q) (8)
Subject to: q ≥ qγ and q = 1
d
·
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φ(k)
where qγ is chosen such that s(qγ) = γ. Since γ ∈
(γmin, γmax), we have qγ ∈ (0, 1) (see Proposition 4.1).
The next proposition establishes the existence of an optimal
policy, of problem P1, that satisfies all its the constraints, with
equality.
Proposition 4.3: If α2 > α1, then problem P1 has an
optimal solution φopt = {φoptk , k ≥ 1} such that
∑
k≥1 k ·
p(k) · φopt(k) = d · qγ
Proof: In Appendix D-A.
From Proposition 4.3, we can see that problem P1 has an
optimal solution that satisfies all its constraints with equality.
Therefore, to obtain a solution of problem P1, we restrict our
search to the set of policies that satisfy the constraints of
problem P1 with equality. Subsequently, a change of variable
gives us the following linear program
P2 : min{νk,k≥1}
d · qγ ·
∑
k≥1 νk · µk(qγ) (9)
Subject to:
∑
k≥1 νk = 1 and 0 ≤ νk ≤
k · p(k)
d · qγ
∀k ≥ 1
where µk(qγ) =
sk(qγ)·ck
k . The following proposition es-
tablishes a crucial relation between the optimal solutions of
problems P1 and P2.
Proposition 4.4: Let {νoptk , k ≥ 1} be an optimal solution
of problem P2. If α2 > α1, then we can obtain an optimal
solution of problem P1 as follows
φopt(k) =
{
0 if p(k) = 0
νoptk ·d·qγ
k·p(k) otherwise
Proof: In Appendix D-B.
Therefore, to obtain an optimal solution of problem P1, we
just need to solve P2 and apply Proposition 4.4. Problem P2
is a linear program and can be solved by any well-known LP-
solver in polynomial time (O((kmax)3.5) time, where kmax
is the maximum node degree in the network)[23]. However,
we exploit the rich structure of this problem and solve it in
linearithmic time O(kmax · log(kmax))
Let S = {1, 2, · · · , kmax}. Here, kmax is the maximum
degree of the network. Consider a permutation σ : S → S
such that if k1 < k2, then µσ(k1)(qγ) ≤ µσ(k2)(qγ), i.e.,
µσ(1)(qγ) ≤ µσ(2)(qγ) ≤ · · · ≤ µσ(kmax)(qγ). The permu-
tation σ can be obtained in O(kmax · log(kmax)) time by
sorting the set {µk(qγ), k ≥ 1} in ascending order. Using
this order, we can obtain an optimal solution νa of problem
P2 in Θ(kmax) time by following the steps in Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2, νak denotes the k
th component of vector
νa. We illustrate the principle behind Algorithm 2 using a
jar filling analogy. Variable νaσ(j) can be interpreted as a
jar with capacity σ(j)·p(σ(j))
d·qγ . The for loop in the algorithm
is equivalent to filling these jars with water from another
jar of unit capacity, in an ascending order, as given by the
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to compute optimal solution of P2
1: res := 1 and νa := [0, 0, · · · , 0] — a 1× kmax vector
2: for j ∈ [1, 2, · · · , kmax] do
3: if res > 0 then
4: νaσ(j) = min
{
res, σ(j)·p(σ(j))
d·qγ
}
5: res := res− νaσ(j)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return νa
permutation σ. From steps 1, and 4− 5 of Algorithm 2, it is
easy to see that νa is a feasible solution of problem P2. The
optimality of νa with respect to problem P2 is established by
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5: The vector νa returned by Algorithm 2 is
an optimal solution of problem P2.
Proof: In Appendix E.
V. CASCADE SIZE MAXIMIZATION UNDER BUDGET
CONSTRAINT
In this section, we consider the challenge faced by a
resource-constrained campaigner. The campaigner desires to
maximize the campaign size, but is constrained by limited
resources. Let c denote the limit on the expected incentiviza-
tion cost. Then, we can formulate the cost-constrained cascade
maximization problem as follows
P3 : max
0≤φ≤1
s(q)
Subject to:
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k)φ(k)sk(q) ≤ c
and q =
1
d
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φ(k)
A. Solution approach
Let sopt be the optimum value of problem P3. From Propo-
sition 4.1, we know that there exists a unique qopt ∈ (0, 1)
such that s(qopt) = sopt. From Proposition 4.1, we know that
∂s(q)
∂q > 0, i.e., s(q) is a monotonically increasing bijection.
Therefore, it can be argued that qopt can be obtained by solving
the following optimization problem
P4 : max
0≤φ≤1
q
Subject to:
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k)φ(k)sk(q) ≤ c
and q =
1
d
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φ(k)
Let us define µk(q) =
sk(q)·ck
k and νk(q) =
k·p(k)·φ(k)
d·q .
Then, problem P4 can be re-written as follows
P5 : max
ν,q∈(0,1)
q
Subject to: d · q ·
∑
k≥1 νk(q) · µk(q) ≤ c∑
k≥1 νk(q) = 1 and 0 ≤ νk(q) ≤
k · p(k)
d · q ∀ k ≥ 1
Now, given a q ∈ (0, 1), consider the following criteria
7(1) d · q ·∑k≥1 νk(q) · µk(q) ≤ c
(2)
∑
k≥1 νk(q) = 1
(3) 0 ≤ νk(q) ≤ k·p(k)d·q ∀k ≥ 1
If we can find a vector ν that satisfies the above criteria,
then the 2-tuple (ν, q) is a feasible solution of problem P5. Let
νa(q) be the vector output by Algorithm 2 when qγ is set to q.
From Proposition 4.5, we know that this vector minimizes the
LHS of criterion (1) subject to criteria (2) and (3). Therefore, if
we have d ·q ·∑k≥1 νak (q) ·µk(q) > c, then for the given value
of q, no vector ν can satisfy criterion (1). Now, let νa(q+∆q)
be the vector output by Algorithm 2 when qγ is set to q+∆q.
Then, for any ∆q > 0, if d · q ·∑k≥1 νak (q) · µk(q) > c, then
we have
c < d · q
∑
k≥1
νak (q) · µk(q)
(a)
≤ d · q ·
∑
k≥1
νak (q + ∆q) · µk(q)
(b)
≤ d · (q + ∆q) ·
∑
k≥1 ν
a
k (q + ∆q) · µk(q + ∆q) (10)
where Inequality (a) follows because the vector νa(q) is an
optimal solution and νa(q + ∆q) is just a feasible point at q,
and Inequality (b) follows because ∂µk(q)∂q =
ck
k · ∂sk(q)∂q ≥ 0
(see Proposition 4.2). From Inequality 10 we can conclude that
if there does not exist a vector ν that satisfies criteria (1)-(3)
for some q ∈ (0, 1), then no vector satisfies these criteria for
any q
′ ∈ (q, 1). Therefore, the optimal value qopt is given by
the largest value of q in [0, 1] such that vector νa(q) satisfies
criteria (1), and can be computed using the following algorithm
Algorithm 3 Algorithm to compute optimum of P3
1: Set q1 := 0 and q2 := 1
2: while |s(q1)− s(q2)| >  do
3: qmp := (q1 + q2)/2
4: Set qγ = qmp in Algorithm 2 and obtain νa(qmp)
5: if d · qmp ·
∑
k≥1 ν
a
k (qmp) · µk(qmp) > c then
6: q2 := qmp
7: else
8: q1 := qmp
9: end if
10: end while
11: Return qopt := (q1 + q2)/2
Algorithm 3 does a line search to find the largest values of
q ∈ [0, 1] such that the tuple (νa(q), q) meets criteria (1)-(3).
VI. SIMULATION AND NUMERICAL EVALUATIONS
We formulated and solved the optimization problems assum-
ing an uncorrelated, locally tree-like and connected network.
However, real world social networks may contain triads, loops,
multiple connected components, and need not be uncorrelated.
Despite such differences, we show that, in most cases, our
analytical results closely match the simulations on real world
social networks. We evaluate our analytical results on two
very different networks: Gnutella [24] — a p2p file sharing
network, and Hamsterster [25] — a social network for people
with pet hamsters. Table II presents a few statistical measures
of these networks. The degree distributions of these networks
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Fig. 2. Degree distribution of network A (Gnutella network); the thick black
line denotes the best fit of the power law to the degree distribution.
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Fig. 3. Degree distribution of network B (Hamsterster network); the thick
black line denotes the best fit of the power law to the degree distribution.
are displayed in Figures 2 and 3. All simulations are
averaged over 10000 runs. To enhance legibility, error bars
are suppressed in all the plots.
TABLE II
SIMPLE PARAMETERS OF THE TWO REAL-WORLD NETWORKS USED FOR
SIMULATIONS.
Network A Network B
Source p2p-Gnutella08 [24] Hamsterster [25]
Network category Peer-to-peer Social
Nodes 6301 2426
Edges 20777 16631
Maximum degree 273 97
Average degree 6.59 13.71
Number of triangles 2383 53265
Clustering coefficient 0.01 0.51
Connected components 2 148
We first evaluate the correctness of the analytical calculation
of the campaign size, i.e., s(q). The simulation plots were
generated by considering a linear threshold model where nodes
register if at least 50% of their neighbours are active. We
assume that 30% of the nodes in the network were zealous.
For a different values of q, we studied three schemes: φall
— incentivizing all nodes equally with probability q, φhigh
— incentivizing nodes starting from the highest degree till
degree k′ such that q = 1
d
∑
k≥k′ p(k)φ
high(k), and φlow —
incentivizing nodes starting from the lowest degree till degree
k′ such that q = 1
d
∑
1≤k≤k′ p(k)φ
high(k). The analytical
results were obtained by extracting the degree distribution
from the networks.
The number of triangles in the p2p Gnutella network is
very small, which is also reflected in the clustering coefficient.
Therefore, the Gnutella network is very similar to a locally
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Fig. 4. Analytical and simulated values of s(q) on network A (Gnutella
network).
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Fig. 6. Analytical and simulated values of average cost vs. γ for network
A (Gnutella network).
tree-like network. As consequence of this, for the Gnutella
network, the simulation and analytical results are in excellent
agreement with each other (see Fig. 4). On the other hand,
one can observe a deviation of the simulation results from
the analytical on Hamsterster for large values of q (see
Fig. 5). This behaviour may in part be due to the presence
of significant number of triangles and loops in the network.
Next, we consider a linear incentive structure, where an
incentivized node obtains a unit reward per neighbour, i.e.,
ck = k, ∀ k ≥ 1. For the cost minimization problem,
for a given γ, using the degree distributions, we analytically
 0
 1.5
 3
 4.5
 0.314  0.315  0.316  0.317  0.318  0.319  0.32  0.321  0.322  0.323  0.324
α1=0.2, α2=0.3
Analytical Simulation
 0
 1.5
 3
 4.5
 6
 0.31  0.32  0.33  0.34  0.35  0.36  0.37  0.38  0.39  0.4
A
v
e
r a
g
e
 c
o
s
t
α1=0.2, α2=0.8
 0
 1.5
 3
 4.5
 6
 0.375  0.38  0.385  0.39  0.395  0.4
γ
α1=0.7, α2=0.8
Fig. 7. Analytical and simulated values of average cost vs. γ for network B
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Fig. 8. Analytical and simulated values of cascade size vs. c for network A
(Gnutella network).
compute the solution φ and the average cost. We then simulate
the linear threshold process (nodes register if at least 50%
of their neighbours are active) on the respective real world
networks using the analytical solution φ, and compare the
average cost obtained from analysis and simulations (see Fig. 6
and Fig. 7). Similarly, for the campaign size maximization
problem we analytically compute φ and size s for a given cost
budget c. The analytical solution is then used in the simulation
of cascade maximization problem (see Fig. 8 and Fig. 9).
As observed in Fig. 6 and 7, the analytical average cost
is in excellent agreement with the simulated one for different
values of α1, α2 and γ, on both the networks. Similarly Fig.
8 and 9 show an excellent match between simulation and
analytical computation of campaign size in almost all the
plots. For large values of α1 and α2, the simulated campaign
size in the Hamsterster network is larger than the analytically
computed campaign size. This may in part be due to the large
number of triangles in the network. This suggests that in social
networks containing large number of triangles and loops, the
analytically computed size represents a lower bound.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the problem of campaigning
in social networks by offering incentives for referrals. We used
ideas from percolation theory to compute the campaign size,
which was then used to formulate two optimization problems.
These problems were not amenable to traditional solutions
since they involved a fixed point equation whose solution
was analytically intractable. We used results from reliability
theory to establish some key properties of the fixed point that
enabled us to solve these problems with simple algorithms
having linearithmic time complexity. Although we assumed
an uncorrelated and locally tree-like network in the analysis,
through extensive simulations on real world social networks,
we showed that our analytical results are applicable in real
world networks.
APPENDIX A
SOME RESULTS FROM RELIABILITY THEORY
In this paper, we prove several propositions using the theory
of stochastic order.. Let X and Y be two random variables.
Then, X is said to be smaller than Y in the usual stochastic
order (denoted by X ≤st Y ) [26] if and only if
P [X > x] ≤ P [Y > x] ∀x ∈ (−∞,∞)
Next, we present two theorem from [26] without proof, and
a lemma. We will use these theorems and lemma in several of
our proofs.
Theorem A.1: X ≤st Y if and only if E[ψ(X)] ≤ E[ψ(Y )]
holds for all non-decreasing functions ψ for which the expec-
tation exists.
Proof: Refer Chapter 1 of [26].
Theorem A.2: The usual stochastic order is closed under
convolutions, i.e., If X ≤st Y and X ′ ≤st Y ′ , then X ′ +
X ≤st Y ′ + Y .
Proof: Refer Chapter 1 of [26].
Lemma A.1: (i) Let I(p1) and I(p2) be two Bernoulli
random variable with parameters p1 and p2, then
I(p1) ≤st I(p2) if and only if p1 ≤ p2.
(ii) Let Z(n, p1) and Z(n, p2) be two binomial random
variable with parameters (n, p1) and (n, p2), then for
any n ∈ N, Z(n, p1) ≤st Z(n, p2) if p1 ≤ p2.
Proof: Part (i): By comparing the complementary cumu-
lative distribution function of the two random variable, and by
applying the definition of usual stochastic order.
Part (ii): A binomial random variable with parameter (n, p)
is the sum of n i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable with parameter
p. Now, the result follows from an application of Part (i), and
due to the fact that stochastic order is closed under convolution
(Theorem A.2).
We also use some results from the theory of stochastic
convexity in our proofs. For the sake of completeness, we
reproduce some definitions and theorems from [26]. Let
{X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} be a parametrized collection of random
variables. We say
(a) {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} is stochastically increasing (SI) if
E[ψ(X(θ))] is non-decreasing in θ for all non-decreasing
functions ψ.
(b) {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} is stochastically increasing and convex
(SICX) if {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SI and E[ψ(X(θ))] is non-
decreasing and convex in θ for all non-decreasing convex
functions ψ.
(c) {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} is stochastically increasing and linear
(SIL) if {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SICX and E[ψ(X(θ))] is
non-decreasing and concave in θ for all non-decreasing
concave functions ψ.
Note that, by definition, we have {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SIL ⇒
{X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SICX .
Lemma A.2: Let X(n, p) be a binomial random variable
with parameters (n, p). Then, {X(n, p), p ∈ (0, 1)} ∈ SICX .
Proof: By combining example Example 8.B.3 and Theo-
rem 8.B.9 of [26], it can shown that {X(n, p), p ∈ (0, 1)} ∈
SIL. Then, due to the fact that SIL ⇒ SICX , the lemma
follows.
Theorem A.3: Suppose {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} and {Y (θ), θ ∈ Θ}
are two collection of random variables such that X(θ) and
Y (θ) are independent for each θ. If {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SICX
and {Y (θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SICX , then {X(θ) + Y (θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈
SICX .
Proof: Refer the proof of Theorem 8.A.15 in [26].
Theorem A.4: Suppose that for each θ ∈ Θ, the support of
X(θ) is in N. Then, {X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SICX if and only if
{X(θ), θ ∈ Θ} ∈ SI and P [X(θ) > m] is non-decreasing
and convex in θ for all m ∈ N.
Proof: Refer the proof of Theorem 8.A.10 in [26].
APPENDIX B
EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF THE FIXED POINT
In this section, we show that for any q ∈ [0, 1], the fixed
point Equation 3 has a unique solution. The proof in this
section is split into two parts. In the first part, we show that
function f(q, u) is monotonically increasing and convex in u.
In the section part, we use the result of the first part to establish
the existence and uniqueness of the fixed point.
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A. Proof of Proposition 3.1
The differentiability of f(q, u) follows from its definition. In
this section, we show that f(q, u) is monotonically increasing
and convex in u ∈ (0, 1). To show this, we use the theory of
stochastic convexity.
Let {X(k2, α2u), u ∈ (0, 1)} and {Y (k − k2, α1u), u ∈
(0, 1)} be two collection of independent binomial random
variables with parameters (k2, α2u) and (k − k2, α1u), re-
spectively.
Then, from Lemma A.2, we have {X(k2, α2u), u ∈
(0, 1)} ∈ SICX and {Y (k − k2, α1u), u ∈ (0, 1)} ∈ SICX .
Since the random variables are independent, an application of
Theorem A.3 gives us {X(k2, α2u) + Y (k − k2, α1u), u ∈
(0, 1)} ∈ SICX . Now, by applying Theorem A.4 we can
conclude that
(1) {X(k2, α2u) + Y (k − k2, α1u), u ∈ (0, 1)} ∈ SI .
(2) P [X(k2, α2u)+Y (k−k2, α1u) > m] is a non-decreasing
convex function of u ∈ (0, 1) for all m ∈ N.
Let h(u, k, k2,m) = P [X(k2, α2u)+Y (k−k2, α1u) > m].
We note that function h(u, k, k2,m) is non-decreasing and
convex in u. Since the network is connected and the frac-
tion of zealous nodes lies in the open interval (0, 1), there
exists positive integers k0,m0 such that m0 ∈ (0, k0] and
pex(k0)pth(m0|k0 + 1) > 0. Therefore, we have
∂f(q, u)
∂u
=
∑
k≥1
pex(k)
∑
m≥1
pth(m|k + 1) ·
k∑
k2=0
pˆ(k2|k)·
∂h(u, k, k2,m)
∂u
· (1− I{k=k0,m=m0,k2=k})
+ pex(k0)pth(m0|k0 + 1)∂P [X(k0, uα2) ≥ m0]
∂u
(a)
> 0
where Inequality (a) follows because h(u, k, k2,m) and
P [X(k0, uα2) ≥ m0],m0 ∈ (0, k0] are non-decreasing and
monotonically increasing functions of u, respectively. Simi-
larly, we have
∂2f(q, u)
∂u2
=
∑
k≥1
pex(k)
∑
m≥0
pth(m|k + 1)
k∑
k2=0
pˆ(k2|k)·
∂2h(u, k, k2,m)
∂u2
(b)
≥ 0
where Inequality (a) follows because h(u, k, k2,m) is convex
in u.
B. Proof of Proposition 3.2
We recollect that u denotes the probability of finding a
registered node by following an arbitrary link of the network.
Nodes with zero threshold do not need any recommendations,
and are registered from the start of the campaign. Thus, if
every node has threshold value zero, then the entire network
is registered and we have u = 1. On the other hand, nodes
with non-zero threshold have to be recommended by active
nodes to register. Therefore, if all nodes in the network have
non-zero threshold, then there are no node from which the
campaign can start. Hence, in such scenarios, we have u = 0.
Now, let us consider the case when the fraction of zealous
nodes lies in the interval (0, 1). Let us define f0(u) =
f(q, u) − u. It is easy to see that u0 is a fixed point of
Equation 3 if and only if f0(u0) = 0. By differentiating f0(u)
with respect to u twice, we get ∂
2f0(u)
∂u2 =
∂2f(q,u)
∂u2 ≥ 0, i.e.,
f0 is a convex function of u. We also have
f0(0) = f(q, 0) =
∑
k≥0 pex(k) · pth(0|k + 1)
(a)
> 0
f0(1) = f(q, 1)− 1 (b)< 0
where Inequality (a) follows because the network is connected
and the fraction of zealous nodes lies in the open interval
(0, 1), and Inequality (b) follows because the f(q, 1) is a
convex combination of non-negative terms less or equal to
1 (some terms are strictly less that 1). Since f0(0) > 0 and
f0(1) < 0, due to the continuity of function f0, there exist a
point u0 ∈ (0, 1) such that f0(u0) = 0 i.e., f(q, u0) = u0.
We prove the uniqueness of the fixed point by contradiction.
Now, if u0, u1 ∈ (0, 1) are two fixed points of Equation (3),
then we should have f0(u0) = f0(u1) = 0. Without loss of
generality, let us assume that 0 < u0 < u1 < 1. Now, choose
positive real numbers u2 ∈ (u1, 1) and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
f0(u2) < 0 and u1 = λu0 + (1− λ)u2. Then, we have
f0(λu0 + (1− λ)u2) = f0(u1) = 0 and
λf0(u0) + (1− λ)f0(u2) = (1− λ)f0(u2) < 0
=⇒ f0(λu0 + (1− λ)u2)
(c)
> λf0(u0) + (1− λ)f0(u2)
Inequality (c) contradicts the convex nature of function f0.
Thus, in turn, establishes the uniqueness of the fixed point.
APPENDIX C
INCREASING NATURE OF THE FIXED POINT
First we introduce some notation and present some prelimi-
nary observations. We will use these observations in the proof
of Proposition 3.3. Let
hm,k(q) =
k∑
k2=0
(
k
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k−k2P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m]
where random variables Xk2 and Yk−k2 are independent and
have a binomial distribution with parameters (k2, α2u) and
(k − k2, α1u), respectively. The first step in the proof of
Proposition 3.3 is to show that for any m ∈ Z+, P [Xk2 +
Yk−k2 ≥ m] is a non-decreasing function of k2 ∈ [0, k]. Let
ϕm,k(k2) = P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m] ∀k2 ∈ [0, k]
We note that if u ∈ (0, 1] then ϕm,k(k2) = 0 only if m > k,
i.e., if the number of active neighbours is greater than the node
degree.
Lemma C.1: For any m, k ∈ Z+, ϕm,k(k2) is non-
decreasing function of k2 ∈ [0, k].
Proof: Consider two integers k2, k
′
2 ∈ [0, k]. Without loss
of generality, let k
′
2 > k2 and define the following random
variables
Wk2 = Xk2 + Yk−k2 and Wk′2 = Xk′2 + Yk−k′2
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Then, we have
Wk2 =st Xk2 + Yk−k2
=st
∑k2
i=1
Ii(α2u) +
∑k−k2
i=1
Ii(α1u)
where Ii(p) are independent Bernoulli random variable with
parameter p and =st implies equality in distribution [26].
Therefore, for any k
′
2 > k2 and k2, k
′
2 ∈ [0, k], we have
Wk2 =st
∑k2
i=1
Ii(α2u) +
∑(k−k′2)+(k′2−k2)
i=1
Ii(α1u)
=st
∑k2
i=1
Ii(α2u) +
∑k−k′2
i=1
Ii(α1u) +
∑k′2−k2
i=1
Ii(α1u)
(a)
≤ st
∑k2
i=1
Ii(α2u) +
∑k−k′2
i=1
Ii(α1u) +
∑k′2−k2
i=1
Ii(α2u)
=st
∑k′2
i=1
Ii(α2u) +
∑k−k′2
i=1
Ii(α1u) =st Wk′2
where Inequality (a) follows because α1 < α2 ⇒ α1u ≤ α2u,
and due to Lemma A.1. Hence, we have established that for
k2, k
′
2 ∈ [0, k] and k
′
2 > k2, we have Wk2 ≤st Wk′2 . Thus,
∀m ∈ Z+ and k′2 > k2, we have
ϕm,k(k2) = P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m] = P [Wk2 ≥ m]
(b)
≤ P [Wk′2 ≥ m] = P [Xk′2 + Yk−k′2 ≥ m] = ϕm,k(k
′
2)
where Inequality (b) follows because Wk2 ≤st Wk′2 . Thus,
we have shown that ϕm,k(k2) is a non-decreasing function of
k2 ∈ [0, k].
Now, let us define
ψm,k(k2) =
k · ϕm,k(k2)
(k − k2) ∀k2 ∈ [0, k − 1]
Due to Lemma C.1, we can conclude that for any m, k ∈
Z+, ψm,k(k2) is also a non-decreasing function of k2 ∈ [0, k−
1]. Next, establish that the function f(q, u) is monotonically
increasing in q.
Proposition C.1: If α2 > α1, then ∂f(q,u)∂q > 0.
Proof:
hm,k(q) =
k∑
k2=0
(
k
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k−k2P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m]
=
∑k−1
k2=0
(
k
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k−k2P [Xk2 + Yk−k2 ≥ m]
+ qm · P [Xk ≥ m]
= (1− q)
∑k−1
k2=0
(
k − 1
k2
)
qk2(1− q)k−k2 · ψm,k(k2)
+ qm · P [Xk ≥ m]
= (1− q) · E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q))] + qm · P [Xk ≥ m]
where Z(k− 1, q) is a binomial random variable with param-
eters (k − 1, q).
Now, consider two real numbers q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1] such that
q1 < q2. Then, we have
hm,k(q1) = (1− q1)E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q1))]
+ (q1)
mP [Xk ≥ m]
(a)
≤ (1− q1)E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q1))] + (q2)mP [Xk ≥ m]
(b)
≤ (1− q1)E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q2))] + (q2)mP [Xk ≥ m]
= (1− q2)E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q2))] + (q2)mP [Xk ≥ m]
+ (q2 − q1)E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q2))]
= hm,k(q2) + (q2 − q1)E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q2))] (11)
where
(a) follows because q1 < q2.
(b) since q1 < q2, we have Z(k − 1, q1) ≤st Z(k − 1, q2)
(Lemma A.1). Therefore, due to the non-decreasing nature
of function ψm,k, we have E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q1))] ≤
E[ψm,k(Z(k − 1, q2))] (Theorem A.1).
Also, from the definition, we also have
hm,k(q1) = E[ϕm,k(Z(k, q1))]
(c)
≤ E[ϕm,k(Z(k, q2))] = hm,k(q2) (12)
where Inequality (c) follows because of Lemma A.1,
Lemma C.1 and Theorem A.1.
From Equations (11) and (12), we can see that for any
q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1] such that q1 < q2, we have hm,k(q1) =
hm,k(q2) if and only if E[ψm,k(Z(k− 1, q2))] = 0. From the
definition of function ψm,k, we can see that E[ψm,k(Z(k −
1, q2))] = 0 if and only if m > k. Thus, if m ∈ [0, k], then
we can conclude that hm,k(q1) < hm,k(q2).
Since the network is connected and the fraction of
zealous nodes lies in the open interval (0, 1), there ex-
ists positive integers k0,m0 such that m0 ∈ (0, k0] and
pex(k0)pth(m0|k0 + 1) > 0. Therefore, for q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1]
such that q1 < q2, we have hm0,k0(q1) < hm0,k0(q2). Let
z0 =
∑
k≥1 pex(k)pth(0|k + 1) — fraction of zealous nodes.
Thus, we have
f(q1, u) = z0 +
∑
k≥1
∑
m≥1
pex(k)pth(m|k + 1)hm,k(q1)
=
∑
k≥1
∑
m≥1
pex(k)pth(m|k + 1)hm,k(q1)(1− I{
m=m0
k=k0
})
+ pex(k0)pth(m0|k0 + 1) · hm0,k0(q1) + z0
<
∑
k≥1
∑
m≥1
pex(k)pth(m|k + 1)hm,k(q1)(1− I{
m=m0
k=k0
})
+ pex(k0)pth(m0|k0 + 1) · hm0,k0(q2) + z0
≤
∑
k≥1
∑
m≥1
pex(k)pth(m|k + 1)hm,k(q2)(1− I{
m=m0
k=k0
})
+ pex(k0)pth(m0|k0 + 1) · hm0,k0(q2) + z0
= f(q2, u)
i.e., for q1, q2 ∈ [0, 1] such that q1 < q2, we have f(q1, u) <
f(q2, u).
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A. Proof of Proposition 3.3
The continuity of the fixed point follows from the fact that
function f(·, u) is a continuous map for all u ∈ [0, 1]. To prove
the increasing nature of the fixed point, we use the implicit
function theorem.
Let f0(q, u) = f(q, u) − u. According to the implicit
function theorem, when f0(q, u) = 0, we have
du
dq
= −
∂f0(q,u)
∂q
∂f0(q,u)
∂u
=
∂f(q,u)
∂q(
1− ∂f(q,u)∂u
)
From Proposition 3.2, we know that for every q ∈ [0, 1],
there is a unique fixed point uq ∈ (0, 1) that satisfies
f(q, uq) = uq i.e., f0(q, uq) = 0. Therefore, we have
duq
dq
=
∂f(q,uq)
∂q(
1− ∂f(q,u)∂u
∣∣∣
u=uq
)
From Proposition C.1, we know that ∂f(q,u)∂q > 0,∀u ∈
(0, 1). Since uq ∈ (0, 1), we have ∂f(q,uq)∂q > 0. Now, to prove
Proposition 3.3, we just need to show that ∂f(q,u)∂u
∣∣∣
u=uq
< 1.
We show this by contradiction. We note that f(q, 1)
(a)
< 1,
where Inequality (a) follows because the f(q, 1) is a convex
combination of non-negative terms less than or equal to 1
(some terms are strictly less that 1). Since the function f(q, u)
is continuous and non-decreasing in u (see Proposition 3.1),
there exists a point u
′
q ∈ (uq, 1) such that f(q, u
′
q) < u
′
q .
We note that the function f(q, u) is convex in u ∈ (0, 1) (see
Proposition 3.1). Now, let us assume that ∂f(q,u)∂u
∣∣∣
u=uq
≥ 1.
Then, from the definition of convex functions, we have
f(q, u
′
q) ≥ f(q, uq) + (u
′
q − uq) ·
∂f(q, u)
∂u
∣∣∣
u=uq
≥ f(q, uq) + (u′q − uq)
(b)
= uq + (u
′
q − uq) = u
′
q
⇒ f(q, u′q)
(c)
≥ u′q
where Inequality (b) follows because we have f(q, uq) = uq .
Inequality (c) contradicts the fact that f(q, u
′
q) < u
′
q .
Since this contradiction was due to the assumption that
∂f(q,u)
∂u
∣∣∣
u=uq
≥ 1, we should have ∂f(q,u)∂u
∣∣∣
u=uq
< 1. This,
in turn, establishes that duqdq > 0.
APPENDIX D
EQUIVALENCE TO THE LINEAR PROGRAM
In this section, we prove the equivalence between problems
P1 and P2 presented in Section IV
A. Proof of Proposition 4.3
Let the value of the objective of problem P1 for incentive-
policy φ be denoted as c(φ). Let φo = {φok, k ≥ 1} be an
optimal solution of problem P1. If we have
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) ·
φo(k) = d · qγ , then we can choose φopt = φo.
So, let us assume that 1
d
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φo(k) = qo > qγ .
Our goal to obtain a policy φopt from φo without increasing
the cost. Let φopt = qγqoφ
o. Then, we have
1
d
∑
k≥1
kp(k) · φopt(k) = qγ
qod
∑
k≥1
k · p(k) · φo(k) = qγ (13)
and 0 ≤ φopt ≤ φo ≤ 1 (14)
From Equality (13) and Inequality (14) we can see that φopt
is a feasible solution of problem P1. Further, we also have
c(φo) =
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k) · φ
o(k) · sk(qo)
(a)
≥
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k) · φ
opt(k) · sk(qo)
(b)
≥
∑
k≥1 ck · p(k) · φ
opt(k) · sk(qγ)
= c(φopt)
(c)
≥ c(φo)⇒ c(φo) = c(φopt)
where Inequality (a) follows because φopt ≤ φo, Inequality (b)
follows because q0 > qγ and sk(q) is non-decreasing in q
(Proposition 4.2), and Inequality (c) follows because φo is an
optimal solution of problem P1.
Since the cost for policies φo and φopt are equal, and φo
is an optimal policy, we can conclude that policy φopt is also
an optimal solution of problem P1.
B. Proof of Proposition 4.4
Let νopt = {νoptk , k ≥ 1} be an optimal solution of problem
P2. Let us define
φf (k) =
{
0 if p(k) = 0
νoptk ·d·qγ
k·p(k) otherwise
Then, we have
1
d
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φ
f (k) = qγ
∑
k≥1 ν
opt
k
(a)
= qγ (15)
φf (k) =
0 < 1 if p(k) = 0νoptk ·d·qγ
k·p(k)
(b)
≤ 1 otherwise
(16)
where Equality (a) and Inequality (b) follows because
{νoptk , k ≥ 1} is a feasible solution of problem P2. From
Equality (15) and Inequality (16), we can conclude that φf is
a feasible solution of problem P1.
Now, let φopt = {φoptk , k ≥ 1} be an optimal solution
of problem P1 such that
∑
k≥1 k · p(k) · φopt(k) = d · qγ .
The existence of such an optimal policy is guaranteed by
Proposition 4.3. Let us define
νf (k) =
k · p(k) · φoptk
d · qγ
Then, we have
∑
k≥1 ν
f (k) =
∑
k≥1
k·p(k)·φoptk
d·qγ = 1 and 0 ≤
νk =
k·p(k)·φoptk
d·qγ ≤
k·p(k)
d·qγ . Hence, ν
f is a feasible solution of
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problem P2. Further, we also have∑
k≥1 ckp(k)φ
opt(k)sk(qγ) ≤
∑
k≥1 ckp(k)φ
f (k)sk(qγ)
= d · qγ
∑
k≥1 ν
opt
k · µk(qγ) ≤ d · qγ
∑
k≥1 ν
f
k · µk(qγ)
=
∑
k≥1
ckp(k)φ
opt(k)sk(qγ)
⇒
∑
k≥1
ckp(k)φ
opt(k)sk(qγ) =
∑
k≥1
ckp(k)φ
f (k)sk(qγ)
⇒ φf is an optimal solution of problem P1.
APPENDIX E
OPTIMALITY OF ALGORITHM 2
In this section, we prove that the vector νa returned by
Algorithm 2 is an optimal point of problem P2. However,
as a first step, we prove the following lemma. Let S =
{1, 2, · · · , kmax} and kmax is the maximum degree in the
network.
Lemma E.1: Let ν, a 1×kmax vector, be a feasible solution
of problem P2. Then, we have∑j0
j=1
νaσ(j) ≥
∑j0
j=1
νσ(j) ∀j0 ∈ S
Proof: We prove this lemma by induction. For j0 = 1,
we have
νaσ(1) = min
{
1,
σ(1) · p(σ(1))
d · qγ
}
(a)
≥ νσ(1) (17)
where Inequality (a) follows because ν is a feasible solution
of problem P2. Now, let us assume that
∑j1
j=1 ν
a
σ(j) ≥∑j1
j=1 νσ(j) for some j1 ∈ S . We need to show that∑j1+1
j=1 ν
a
σ(j) ≥
∑j1+1
j=1 νσ(j).
If we have νaσ(j1+1) ≥ νσ(j1+1), then the result is trivial.
Let us therefore consider the case where νaσ(j1+1) < νσ(j1+1).
This implies that
νaσ(j1+1) < νσ(j1+1) ≤
σ(j1 + 1) · p(σ(j1 + 1))
d · qγ
⇒ νaσ(j1+1)
(b)
= 1−
∑j1
j=1
νaσ(j)
where Equality (b) follows because of steps 4 and 5 of
Algorithm 2. Therefore, if νaσ(j1+1) < νσ(j1+1), then we have∑j1+1
j=1
νaσ(j) = 1 =
∑
j∈S νσ(j) ≥
∑j1+1
j=1
νσ(j)
A. Proof of Proposition 4.5
Let ν be a feasible solution of problem P2. Since νa
and ν are feasible solutions of problem P2, we have∑
j≥1 ν
a(σ(j)) =
∑
j≥1 ν(σ(j)) = 1. Let X
a and X two
independent random variable taking values from the set S
such that P [Xa = j] = νaσ(j) and P [X = j] = νσ(j).
Then, from Lemma E.1, we have
P [Xa ≤ j0] =
j0∑
j=1
νaσ(j) ≥
j0∑
j=1
νσ(j) = P [X ≤ j0] (18)
From Equation 18 and the definition of usual stochastic
orders we can see that Xa ≤st X . Therefore, we have∑
k≥1 ν
a
k · µk(qγ) =
∑
j∈S ν
a
σ(j) · µσ(j)(qγ)
=
∑
j∈S P [X
a = j] · µσ(j)(qγ) = E[µσ(Xa)(qγ)]
(a)
≤ E[µσ(X)(qγ)] =
∑
j∈S P [X = j] · µσ(j)(qγ)
=
∑
j∈S νσ(j) · µσ(j)(qγ) =
∑
k≥1 νk · µk(qγ) (19)
where Inequality (a) follows from an application of The-
orem A.1 (Xa ≤st X and µσ(j)(qγ) is a non-decreasing
function of j).
Let νopt be an optimal solution of P2. Then, we have the
following inequalities∑
k≥1
νoptk · µk(qγ) ≤
∑
k≥1
νak · µk(qγ)
(b)
≤
∑
k≥1
νoptk · µk(qγ)
=⇒
∑
k≥1
νoptk · µk(qγ) =
∑
k≥1
νak · µk(qγ)
=⇒ νa is an optimal solution of P2
where Inequality (b) follows by setting ν to νopt in Inequal-
ity (19).
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